Fog and Edge computing provide a large pool of resources at the edge of the network that may be used for distributed computing. Fog infrastructure heterogeneity also results in complex configuration of distributed applications on computing nodes. Linux containers are a mainstream technique allowing to run packaged applications and micro services. However, running applications on remote hosts owned by third parties is challenging because of untrusted operating systems and hardware maintained by third parties. To meet such challenges, we may leverage trusted execution mechanisms. In this work, we propose a model for distributed computing on Fog infrastructures using Linux containers secured by Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) technology. We implement our model on a Docker and OpenSGX platform. The result is a secure and flexible approach for distributed computing on Fog infrastructures.
D R A F T
and Linux containers offers more security (e.g., isolation) than traditional computing models e.g., userbased. However, integrity and confidentiality remain key concerns because of untrusted operating systems and hosts maintained by third-parties in the cloud infrastructure. The primary challenge is how to execute a distributed application securely inside VMs or in Linux containers running on remote hosts (i.e., guaranteeing isolated execution, data integrity and confidentiality). in which each element extends its trust to the next element in the chain until launching applications. This mechanism allows identifying any modification in the host before launching a container [1] . However, such mechanism is not necessarily implemented by remote It is also integrated into Linux containers to protect packaged applications [2] .
Hardware-assisted trusted execution mechanisms such
In this paper, we discuss the challenge of trusted computing on remote hosts. We review different scenarios to Linux containers, there is always a security concern with such computing models: how to secure (i.e., guaranteeing isolated execution of application) remote computations?
Running an application inside VMs/Linux containers may appear more secure than running it on hosts for isolation and confidentiality. For instance, all containers/applications in a host share the same kernel instance. Thus, any kernel compromise results in security vulnerabilities.
The same scenario applies for VMs although isolation is stronger between VMs than containers due to enforced isolation by the virtualization layer. An adversary may employ Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) [4] to retrieve information of the VM. We may also run a container inside a VM, to enforce isolation [5] . However, the real challenge is the execution of the application 
We also consider dataset D = {d 1 , d 2 , ..., d k } to be processed by containers and R = {r 1 , r 2 , ..., r k } the result of data processing. The Process operation of d i by container c i through te on h j is defined as follows:
Definition. c i is a trusted container if its whole image has not been tampered with and proved as such through a hardware-assisted remote attestation mechanism provided by the trusted execution technology te available on hosts in H. tion frameworks enable to manage a set of containers e.g., Kubernetes, on hosts.
Trusted Cluster Creation: To build a trusted cluster composed of several trusted nodes, when a new container c i c i c i wishes to be integrated to the cluster C t C t C t , it initiates the join protocol (Fig. 3) . It consists of a remote attestation mechanism to prove the container as a trusted node, by communicating with the master node. If the container is approved as a trusted node (i.e., the application deployed in the container has not been tampered with), the node is integrated to the cluster and the master starts to send data to the approved container for processing. Otherwise, the node is considered untrusted because the packaged application has been tampered with.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
To implement our prototype, we need a container im- image by implementing specific mechanisms in rkt [11] container engine to provide the remote attestation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have seen that containers hardened by a trusted execution technology like Intel SGX bring more flexibility and security to distributed computing. We proposed a container-based model for secure distributed computing over Fog infrastructures. To illustrate the model, we implemented a container-based MapReduce prototype. Evaluation results show a reasonable performance overhead of using Intel SGX. As future work, we intend to explore AMD-SEV for Linux containers.
